The Impact of Voter Equality on the
Representational Structures of
Local Government
In the decade since its first reapportionment decision in Baker v.
Carr,: the Supreme Court has several times confronted the task of determining the extent to which the requirement of voter equality, or
"one man, one vote," is applicable to local government. 2 The issue has
proved a difficult one. While the Court has firmly established that all
states must meet rigorous standards of voter equality,3 it has acknowledged that a more flexible approach is appropriate in dealing with
local governments.4 Despite this acknowledgment, there has in fact
been a tendency to apply the same strict standards applicable to the
states. Given this tendency, the majority of commentators now believe
that the voter equality requirement is a significant obstacle to the
effective functioning of many existing forms of local government5 and
the creation of regional governments. 6
The voter equality requirement is a serious problem for many of
the eighty thousand units of local government that now exist.7 Outwardly, most units appear to be identical. They are formed by refer1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 There are four local government cases dealing directly with voter equality. Abate v.
Mundt, 403 U.S. 183 (1971); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Sailors v. Kent County Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105
(1967).
3 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), discussed at notes 19-23 infra.
4 Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 183 (1971); Sailors v. Kent County Bd. of Educ., 387 US. 105
(1967).
5 See Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and
Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 21 (1965); Symposium-One
Man-One Vote and Local Government, 36 GEO. WAsH. L. Ray. 689 (1968); SymposiumRestructuringMetropolitan Area Government, 58 Go. L.J. 663 (1970).
6 Dixon, Rebuilding the Urban PoliticalSystem: Some Heresies Concerning Citizen Participation, Community, Metros, and One Man-One Vote, 58 GEO. L.J. 955 (1970); Note,
Reapportionment on the Sub-State Level of Government: Equal Representation or Equal
Vote?, 50 B.U.L. Ray. 231 (1970); Note, The Constitutionalityof the Use of a One UnitOne Vote Rule by Maturing Councils of Government, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 94. But see
Note, Reapportionment-Nine Years into the "Revolution" and Still Struggling, 70 MICH.
L. REv. 586 (1972).
7 Counties account for 3,043 of these units, municipalities 17,996, townships 17,144,
special districts 18,332, and school districts 25,000. COMM. ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
MOD RNIZIG LocAL GovmtNat:

67(1966).
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endum votes under state enabling acts, select members of their governing boards by popular vote, and exercise such public powers as
eminent domain or taxation." They differ significantly in substantive
aspects, however; some local bodies can hardly be thought of as governments. 9 A special district, for example, that supplies water at cost to
all residents of a jurisdiction who do not have wells has a de minimis
impact on nonconsumers. The voter equality requirement may hinder
the establishment of such districts where the legislature considers it
unfair or politically unwise to give every resident voter the same voice
as the intended beneficiaries of the special service. In this context, the
requirement may limit the kinds of governmental functions that can
reasonably be exercised by a local body. It seems undesirable to apply
the principles of reapportionment in a manner that would destroy these
important mechanisms for linking governmental services to the needs of
a local and limited community.
In addition to its impact on many existing forms of local government,
the voter equality requirement is seen as a major barrier to the creation
of regional governments and other multiple-jurisdiction bodies because
it disadvantages the more sparsely populated jurisdictions. These units
are likely to be reluctant to subject themselves to regional government
if it appears that because of the requirement one or two large jurisdictions would have an absolute majority of the regional representation. 10
Even if no such majority were created, smaller jurisdictions would be
deterred from entering otherwise desirable regional arrangements since
allotting regional representation in proportion to population might dilute their control over local affairs to a degree that they would find unacceptable. This consequence of one man, one vote is recognized by state
legislatures, which could in some instances impose regional governments if they chose to do so,"' but have balked at the idea because of
voter resistance in the smaller jurisdictions. 12 In the absence of the voter
8 S. SATO & A. VAN ALSrYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 37-112 (1970).

9 The term "local government" defies definition except as a general label for the following kinds of local bodies: municipalities, counties, New England towns, townships, independent school districts, special districts, and authorities. Id. at 5-13.
10 Dixon, supra note 6, at 981-82. If a voluntary regional agreement is contemplated, a
referendum is the usual method for obtaining voter consent. In addition, the state legislature may be required to enact statutory authorization for local jurisdictions to enter
regional arrangements. Lineberry, Reforming Metropolitan Governance: Requiem or
Reality, 58 GEo. L.J. 675, 707-08 (1970).
11 In most states, however, there are statutory or constitutional limitations on legislative control of political subdivisions in the form of "home rule" provisions. The extent
of these limitations varies widely from state to state. See S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra
note 8, at 218 et seq.
12 Legislatures seem to be reacting to the feeling that it would be unfair to dilute voter
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equality requirement, there would be room for a compromise system
guaranteeing smaller units a minimum amount of representation above
that which they would receive on a population basis.
This comment examines the underlying rationale for applying voter
equality to local government and analyzes the approach that the Supreme Court has taken toward local reapportionment. Specifically,
this analysis probes the implication of the Court's decisions on local
reapportionment for several types of local government, including existing limited-function bodies and emerging regional governments.
I.

REAPPORnONMENT

PRINCIPLES

The issue of local reapportionment followed inevitably from the
4
3
"reapportionment revolution" at the state level' -a "political thicket'1
that the Supreme Court entered in 1962. In Baker v. Carr,"5' the plaintiffs alleged that Tennessee's grossly malapportioned state legislative
districts denied them equal protection of the laws.' The district court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the claim was nonjusticiable.17 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial.
The Court did not comment on the merits of the allegations, nor did
it suggest the form relief might take if the plaintiffs prevailed, except
to make the observation that "[j]udicial standards under the Equal
8
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar .... .
preferences in smaller towns or counties by combining them legislatively with more
populous units and that it would be politically dangerous for the legislators from those

constituencies as well. Lineberry, supra note 10, at 690-91.
13 Reapportionment decisions at the state level naturally stimulated challenges to local
malapportionment and frequently served as models for the analysis of local government
cases. In Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the Supreme Court, in reaching

the decision to apply voter equality to local governments, saw "little difference, in terms
of the application of the Equal Protection Clause and of the principles of Reynolds v.
Sims, between the exercise of state power through legislatures and its exercise by elected
local officials in the cities, towns, and counties." Id. at 481.

14 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946),
first referred to the reapportionment issue as a "political thicket" that the courts ought
not enter.
15 869 U.S. 186 (1962).
16 The plaintiffs explicitly disavowed an equal protection claim based directly on the
theory that the fourteenth amendment entitled them to equal representation and opted
for one based on the failure to apply the existing Tennessee constitutional provision for
reapportionment. See Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv.
252.
17 The district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter and that
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 179 F. Supp. 824
(M.D. Tenn. 1959).
18 869 U.S. at 226. The Court appeared to be following the classic definition of equal
protection when it suggested that the apportionment would be in violation of the law if

it reflected "no policy but simply arbitrary and capricious action." Id. Justice Frankfurter,
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In Reynolds v. Sims,'9 the Court attempted to give content to this
assertion in sustaining an attack on severe disparities among Alabama's
state legislative districts, holding that "an individual's right to vote
for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is
in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens
living in other parts of the State." 20 The Court explicitly stated that
absolute equality was not a necessity and that the state was required
only to construct legislative districts "as nearly of equal population as
is practicable. ' 21 This wording left open the possibility that some future deviations from population equality might be permissible where
"based on legitimate considerations incident to effectuation of a rational state policy .... "22 Thus, Reynolds did not completely forbid
23
the use of factors other than population in the districting process.
Further articulation of the voter equality rule was delayed until
1969, when in Kirkpatrick v. Preisle2 4 the Court was called on to
dissenting, fixed on the central practical dilemma created by the majority's refusal to meet
the question of relief head-on:
[Tihe Court naturally shrinks from asserting that in districting at least substantial
equality is a constitutional requirement enforceable by courts. Room continues to be
allowed for weighting. This of course implies that geography, economics, urban-rural
conflict, and all the other non-legal factors which have throughout our history entered
into political districting are to some extent not to be guled out .... To some extent
-aye, there's the rub.
Id. at 269. In his view, the Court was embarking on a venture for which traditional notions
of equal protection would be of little guidance.
19 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The district court in Reynolds temporarily reapportioned Alabama's house and senate districts for an upcoming primary. The state had last been redistricted in 1901, and in the intervening sixty years, large population shifts had created
substantial disparities of population between districts. The district court managed to
reduce these variances substantially so that the largest senate district was only half as
underrepresented as it had been, while the largest house district was reduced to only five
times the size of the smallest house district. Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala.
1962).
20 377 U.S. at 568. In evaluating the plaintiff's alleged denial of equal protection, the
Court discarded the traditional equal protection standard for measuring the validity of
state legislative classifications. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv.
L. Rxv. 1065 (1969). It treated the plaintiff's allegations as a "right to vote" case bringing
it within the ambit of the new or substantive equal protection. The effect of this change
is to place the burden for justifying legislative classifications on the state. This pattern is
well established for cases dealing with "fundamental rights," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942), one of which is voting, cf. Harper v. Virginia Ed. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966), or with legislative classifications that are found to be "invidious," cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
21 377 U.S. at 577. The Court first enunciated the "nearly as is practicable" standard
for reapportionment in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
22 377 U.S. at 579. This is not a reversion to the traditional equal protection standard
because the burden of proof remains on the state.
23 At one point, the Court suggested that following political subdivision boundaries in
redistricting might be a valid excuse for deviating from population equality. Id. at 578.
24 394 US. 526 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 US. 542 (1969), is a companion case.
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elucidate the meaning of the "as nearly as practicable" standard of
voter equality.25 In Kirkpatrick, the plaintiffs attacked Missouri's congressional redistricting, which, despite an effort to eliminate many
disparities between districts, still contained a three percent difference
between the largest and the average-populated districts.26 Missouri
argued that this discrepancy was sufficiently small to satisfy the nearlyas-practicable standard and, alternatively, that the variances were justifiable. The Court rejected both arguments and held that the legislature was required to "make a good-faith effort to achieve precise
mathematical equality. Unless population variances among Congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the State
must justify each variance, no matter how small." 27 Missouri, however,
was unable to show that its legislature had endeavored to achieve absolute equality. 28 The Court also rejected the state's argument that the
population disparities were justified by a rational state policy of protecting the legislative process of political compromise or by special
considerations of geography, political history, or regional economics. 29
It indicated that the only acceptable justifications were those resulting
from methodological or mechanical shortcomings in the techniques of
redistricting. 30 The standard formulated in Kirkpatrick is thus significantly more rigid than the substantial equality rule articulated in
Reynolds. It approaches a per se rule under which population inequality creates an almost conclusive presumption of invalidity.
II.

LoCAL

GOVERNMENT REAPPORTIONMENT DECISIONS

The application of the voter equality principle to local government
has proceeded along two lines: first, a gradual increase in the scope of
the principle, bringing more forms of local government under its re25 894 U.S. at 528.
26 Id. at 528-29.
27 Id. at 530-31.
28 The state legislature followed the advice of one of its members, who announced that
a two percent deviation from voter equality was sufficient compliance. Id. at 531.
29 Except for the suggestion that the legislative process of reaching a political com-

promise over redistricting should be protected, Missouri's other justifications were similar
to those put forvard in a number of reapportionment cases; deviations are justifiable,
for example, if they prevent fragmentation of distinct economic or social groups, result
from adherence to boundaries of political subdivisions, offset large populations of nonvoters such as college students and military men, preserve compactness of districts, or
anticipate population changes projected to occur between decennial censuses. Id. at 533-36.
30 Justice White's dissent pointed out that the Court's rejection of virtually all con-

ceivable justifications based on convenience or political considerations left only justifica-

tions of a technical nature. Id. at 555. The kinds of technical justifications that the Court
seemed inclined to permit could arise, for example, where population figures were not
available on a street-by-street basis, causing greater inaccuracies in redrawing district lines.
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quirement; and second, a series of changes in the standard of voter
equality.
A.

The Scope of the Voter Equality Requirement
The scope issue is unique to local governments. While one state
government is indistinguishable from another for the purposes of the
voter equality requirement, 31 local governments do differ significantly,
and these differences may warrant diverse approaches to voter equality.
The Supreme Court's initial refusal to apply one man, one vote to all
local governments seems to have been a recognition of this possibility.
In Sailors v. Kent County Board of Education,32 the first local government reapportionment case to be decided on the merits,3 3 the Court
reviewed a Michigan school consolidation plan that significantly "under-represented" the plaintiff's local high school district on the consolidated countywide school board. The county board was formed under
legislation that permitted high school districts, each governed by an
elected board, to confederate for the purposes of improving curriculum
planning and the use of facilities. The board's statutory authority included the power to appoint the county school superintendent, prepare
an annual budget for consolidated programs, and levy an ad valorem
tax. The five members of the county board were chosen yearly by an
assembly of delegates consisting of popularly elected members of the
local school boards. 34 Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court,
held the voter equality requirement inapplicable on two grounds.
First, the Board's representational system was "basically appointive
rather than elective" because special delegates rather than the total
31 One of the basic distinctions between the state and local levels of government is that
a state government can be presumed to govern in some fashion all residents of its jurisdiction, whereas the mere fact that a voter resides within the boundaries of a local government does not necessarily indicate that it has any relationship to him. The lack of any
necessary connection is best illustrated by the fairly common instance in which a voter's
residence is within the boundaries of several local governments. While the functions of
many of these governments are important to the area as a whole, they are frequently so
specialized that many such residents have no greater interest in their activities than residents in other parts of the state. Where these special governments have the power to levy
a property tax, they can affect more than those with an interest in their services, but
others, such as water or sewage districts, frequently pay their way by charging for their
services and have a relationship to only those residents in the market for their services.
At the state level, empirical questions of this sort do not arise since the state has control
over the expansive police power.
32 387 U.S. 105 (1967).

83 The Court dismissed two early local government cases on jurisdictional grounds,
Moody v. Flowers, 287 U.S. 97 (1967), consolidated with Board of Supervisors v. Bianchi,
387 U.S. 97 (1967), and found no voter equality issue in a third, Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S.
112 (1967).
34 387 U.S. at 109 n.6.
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electorate selected the county board. Second, the board's authority and
functions were merely attributes of an administrative, as opposed to a
legislative, body.35 The Court expressed the view that the Constitution
was no impediment to the "need [for] many innovations, numerous
combinations of old and new devices, and great flexibility in municipal
arrangements to meet changing urban conditions."3 6
The two grounds relied on in Sailors illustrate the dimensions of the
scope problem in the application of the voter equality requirement to
local governments. While they produced the same result in Sailors,
they are not parallel considerations, but rather represent different axes
along which the Court has found it necessary to travel. The first axis,
the elective-appointive distinction, appears to stand for the proposition
that one man, one vote applies only to certain procedures for selecting
officers-procedures having direct voter involvement.37 The second axis,
the legislative-administrative distinction, points toward a classification
of local governments, for one man, one vote purposes, based on their
powers and other substantive attributes.38 The latter distinction is considered here first.
1. The Impact of Local Government on Voters-Conflicting Approaches. Since a substantial portion of the more than eighty thousand
units of local government operate under statutory powers comparable to
or narrower than those in Sailors,30 adherence to the administrativelegislative distinction might have exempted many from the voter equality requirement. This possibility was foreclosed, however, in Avery v.
Midland County,40 decided a year after Sailors. In Avery, the plaintiff
challenged gross malapportionment in the districts used for selecting
commissioners for Midland County, Texas. 41 The governmental powers
exercised by the commissioners were rather insignificant, being limited
to maintenance of roads and a few record-keeping functions. 42 The
Court, however, rejected the administrative-legislative distinction urged
35 Id. at 109-11.
36 Id. at 110-11.
87 See text and notes at notes 71-84 infra.
88 For a critique of the legislative-administrative distinction, see Dixon, Local Representation: Constitutional Mandates and Apportionment Options, 36 Gao. WAsH. L. Rv.
693, 735 (1968).
39 See note 7 supra.
40 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
41 The smallest district had a population of 476, while the largest had a population of
67,906. Id. at 475.
42 390 U.S. at 483. The statutory powers of the commissioners were somewhat broader,
but the Texas Supreme Court found that "developments during the years have greatly
narrowed the scope of the functions of the Commissioner's [Board] and limited its major
responsibilities to nonurban areas of the county." 406 S.W.2d 422, 428 (Tex. 1966).
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by the county board as one of those "neat categories favored by civics
texts" 43 and adopted a new formula for fixing the scope of application
of one man, one vote to local government. The new rule required voter
equality where units of local government had "general governmental
power" or "power to make a large number of decisions having a broad
range of impacts on all citizens .... "44 Apparently, the Court intended
by the wording of its test to distinguish between traditional varieties
of local government, such as a city or county, and special or limitedfunction local bodies. 45 The Court rejected the argument that Midland
County government was of no importance to the residents of the City of
Midland; the county board was held to fall into the "general governmental power" class of local governments and therefore was compelled
to redistrict.
The Avery rule was quickly discarded, however, in Hadley v. Junior
College District.46 In that case, voters and residents of the Kansas City
School District challenged a Missouri statute that enabled local school
districts to federate for the purpose of creating a junior college district.
The act provided representation for each constituent school district
approximately according to its proportion of the total school-age population in the new district.4 7 If one local district contained between onethird and one-half of the school-age population, it received two of the
six trustee-representatives; if between one-half and two-thirds, three
trustees; and if over two-thirds, four trustees, with any remaining representation apportioned among the smaller districts. Since the junior college district had only an educational function and a diffuse jurisdiction
independent of city or county boundaries, it appeared insignificant
enough to be exempt from the voter equality requirement under the
Avery test. The Court, however, found two reasons for holding otherwise. First, the Court deemed the Avery test to turn on the impact of a
local government on its citizens; but it rejected this approach because
it found the question of impact judicially unmanageable due to lack of
43 390 U.S. at 482.
44 Id. at 483-85.

45 The Court noted that "virtually every American lives within what he and his neighbors regard as a unit of local government with general responsibility and power for local
affairs. In many cases citizens reside within and are subject to two such governments, a
city and a county." Id. at 483.
46 397 US. 50 (1970).
47 The act relied on "school enumeration"--the number of children between the ages
of six and tventy residing in the district-as the basis for apportionment, but the Court
did not reach the question of the propriety of this method. In the past, the Court has
permitted the substitution of voter registration figures for census data where the former
is more convenient and fairly approximates population figures. Burns v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73 (1966).
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standards. 48 More important, the Court viewed the distinction between
general and special governmental powers as artificial; an equal vote, it
felt, could be important in any election: 49 "There is no discernible,
valid reason," the Court stated, "why constitutional distinctions should
be drawn on the basis of the purpose of the election," 50 adding that
"[iln some instances the election of a local sheriff may be more important than the election of a United States Senator." 51 In lieu of
applying the Avery test, the Court held that the mere fact that a state
chooses to select local officials by an elective process creates a conclusive
presumption that the local government has a significant impact on all
52
potential voters.

While Hadley rejected any consideration of the purpose of an election, however, it expressed, in apparently contradictory fashion, uncertainty about applying the voter equality requirement to "cases in
which the State [chooses to elect] certain functionaries whose duties
are . . . far removed from normal governmental activities and . . .
disproportionately effect different groups ... . ]By acknowledging the

possibility of an exception for local bodies of this sort, the Court undermined its own assumption that the presence of a popular election was
adequate evidence of significant impact on all potential voters. 54
The Hadley rule applies specifically to cases in which a local government has malapportioned its representational districts. Thus, it clearly
forbids "over-representation" of voters in any geographic area. Although it is not done at the state level, 55 local governments frequently
48 But see Kramer v. Free Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); related cases discussed
in text and notes at notes 59-63 infra.
49 It is not dear whether the Court was referring to an equal vote for all voters or only
for those who have an interest in the outcome.
50 397 U.S. at 54.
51 Id. at 55.
52 The Court stated that
as a general rule, whenever a state or local government decides to select persons by
popular election to perform governmental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal
opportunity to participate in that election, and when members of an elected body
are chosen from separate districts, each district must be established on a basis that
will insure, as far as practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials.
Id. at 56.
53 Id.
54 Arguably, Hadley does not go as far as the Court's language makes it appear. It
would be relatively easy to demonstrate that the junior college district was of importance
to most voters simply because of the stake that the community has in education. Certainly, the district was no less significant for the average voter than the Midland County
government.
55 States have used racial or economic criteria to restrict the franchise, but invidious
classifications of this sort are no longer valid. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
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give preferential representation to special constituencies whose membership is thought to be more directly concerned with the activities of
the local government."6 Unequal districting would not be an effective
means of giving greater representation to these groups since their membership is not identified by place of residence. A local government
might, for example, allow property owners alone to elect half of the
unit's representatives, while all voters elect the remaining half

T

a

variety of malapportionment relying on personal rather than geographic
characteristics of the voting population. 8 Arguably, any form of preferential representation in elected local governments would be invalid
under the Hadley rule since the premise of Hadley is that all voters have
a significant stake in local elections. The Court, however, has not applied this premise where preferential representation is not based on
unequal districting.
One such method of preferential representation is for the local
government to limit the franchise to voters having a direct or indirect
interest in its activities. Some support for the view that this form of
"over-representation" may not always be invalid can be found in
663 (1966). States can, however, set minimum qualifications for voters related to their competence. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
56 Cf. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204 (1970), both discussed in note 63 infra.
57 The formation of a special district often requires an affirmative vote of the majority
of property owners. S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 8, at 59-73.
58 In Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co., 70 Cal. 2d 627, 451 P.2d 406, 75 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 821 (1970), residents of a municipal improvements district attacked
the constitutionality of the district's enabling legislation, which gave property owners
greater influence in the district's representative selection process. Under this act, residents
without real property holdings could vote only for three of the district's five governing
board members, while property owners could vote for all five. Moreover, in voting for
their two exclusive representatives, property owners were allotted one vote for every dollar
of assessed value of their property. The plaintiffs argued that the district violated the voter
equality requirement by giving property owners as a group two-thirds more influence in
selecting representation than other residents. They also challenged the district's discrimination between property owners on the basis of the value of their holdings. The California
Supreme Court, however, refused to reach the merits of either claim because it found that
the legislature was about to remedy the situation.
The plaintiffs' second complaint in Leslie was subsequently considered in Burrey v.
Embarcadero Municipal Improvement Dist., 5 Cal. 3d 671, 488 P.2d 395, 97 Cal. Rptr. 203
(1971), involving a local government based on legislation substantially identical to the act
in Leslie. In Burrey, the legislation provided that the district's five-man governing board
be elected by landowners and that each have one vote for every dollar of assessed valuation
of his property. Both individuals and corporations were permitted to vote, and one corporation owned about sixty-five percent of the assessed property in the district. The California Supreme Court invalidated the voting provision of the act on the basis of the voter
equality doctrine even though no unequal districting was at issue, remarking: "Instead
of 'one person, one vote' we have here a case of 'one corporation, 285,689 votes.'" Id. at
679, 488 P.2d at 401, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
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Kramer v. Free Union School District.59 In that case, the school district
limited the franchise to individuals with property interests in the district or children enrolled in the public schools. The Court held that
the state could not exclude otherwise qualified voters from limitedpurpose elections unless "the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest."6 0 While the Court found that no compelling

state interest was served by the exclusions,0 1 it intimated that under
certain circumstances a state or local government might limit the

vote in local elections to those "primarily affected." 62 The Court then
proceeded to determine whether in fact the exclusion of certain voters
63
was related to a lack of impact on them by the local government.
Although the Court found that there was little relationship, what is
important is that it did not assume, as it did in Hadley, that every
qualified voter had a significant interest in any elected local government. It is therefore difficult to reconcile the approaches taken in
Kramer and Hadley.

Following the Kramer view, a case can be made for the validity of
preferential representation where the classification of voters is directly
and rationally related to the effects of local government. In Thompson
64
v. Turlock Irrigation District,
town residents challenged the representation system of a special district created primarily to supply water

90

395 U.S. 621 (1969).
60 Id. at 627.
61 Although the state could not meet the burden of proof required under the compelling state interest test, this does not mean that it is insurmountable. Cf. Abate v.
Mundt, 403 U.S. 183 (1971), discussed in text and notes at notes 91-97 infra.
62 Id. at 632. The New York statute was found to be both under- and overinclusive in
that many disqualified voters were found to be directly concerned with the district's activities (e.g., a teacher with no children who lived with friends) and that many qualified
voters had no interest in the district.
63 Unlike Hadley, Kramer evidenced a willingness on the part of the Court to determine the importance of an election to various groups of voters. Kramer's approach has
been followed in subsequent cases. In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), the
Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion struck down a Louisiana statute that allowed
only property owners to vote on the issuance of city revenue bonds. The Court felt that
non-property owners were not "substantially less interested" in the level of bonding since
the bonds were to be repaid from public utility charges, imposing costs on renters as well
as property owners. Id. at 704-05. And in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970), the
Court invalidated an Arizona restriction of the franchise to property owners in referenda
concerning the issuance of general obligation bonds by local governments. The Court
found that all residents, whether or not they owned property, were affected by the public
facilities and projects financed through general obligation bonding. (The directness of the
relationships that the Court found between the voter and the local government is questioned in note 68 infra.) In both cases, the Court indicated that it would have been satisfied if the state could have shown a more rational basis for the exclusionary classification
of voters.
64 247 Cal. App. 2d 587, 55 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967).
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to rural areas for agricultural purposes. Under its enabling legislation,
the district was required to consider both land area and population in
drawing its representational districts. The resulting system created
"under-representation" in one of the more densely populated sections
of the irrigation district. Greater equality among voters could be attained, but only at the expense of equality in land area, which the
legislature obviously felt should be given full consideration.65
Although the requirement of equality in land area meant that rural
residents were preferentially represented, the result seems defensible
because of the focus of the district's activities. The rural water users
were the intended and actual beneficiaries of the service provided by
the district, while the townspeople were only incidental beneficiaries in
that the town was a purchaser of water from the district. 6 The rural
residents carried the great preponderance of the district's costs because a substantial portion of its operating costs was covered by
charging customers for water on a per-gallon basis and because the
district was empowered to levy a tax on land only to the extent of its
value as unimproved property. Since the district's impact was primarily
on a well-defined segment of the population, preferential representation of rural interests would seem to accord with the notion that a
majority of the governed should be able to elect a majority of the
7
representation.
While the townspeople were tangentially affected by the district's
activities, their interest in the local government was of a substantially
different variety. At some future point, their community might have to
pay higher prices for water if the irrigation district were poorly
managed; in addition, the townspeople might have to bear other costs
of the district passed along to them through increased prices for agricultural commodities. But these effects result from contractual relationships and could exist even if the town were excluded from the
irrigation district. The decision of townspeople, as consumers, to assume
additional costs was not determined by the origin of these costs. Thus,
the district's impact on them was a result of the workings of the market
8
and not direct governmental intervention.
65

Without the agricultural need for the district's service, there was little purpose in

the government and little chance of its formation, which had to be approved by a substantial number of the rural property owners.
66 The water was apparently supplied at cost on the basis of an intergovernmental
agreement entered into after the formation of the district.
67 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
68 In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 899 U.S. 204 (1970), the Court relied in part on a "passing
the costs along" argument to demonstrate that renters are necessarily affected by local
property taxes and therefore by local government. This argument would seem to prove
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Whether the Court will permit preferential representation in a case
similar to Thompson remains to be seen."9 It might do so by activating
Hadley's potential exception for local bodies with greatly disproportionate effects on some groups and by relying on Kramer and related
cases 70 in analyzing the differential impacts of local governments.
Greater fairness would seem to result from treating preferential representation, resulting from either unequal districting or exclusion of
otherwise qualified voters, under one standard. Kramer's approach
seems to be the better one. Continued use of the Hadley rule only
perpetuates the questionable assumption that an elective representation
structure is sufficient to indicate that a government is affecting the
entire population. In reality, it is the actual effect of the government,
not the form of selecting representatives, that identifies those individuals who are governed by a local government and thus establishes
the group for which voter equality is appropriate.
2. Elective Versus Appointive Methods of Representation. As noted
above, the second axis of the scope problem results from the Court's
holding in Sailors that a local government using "appointive" means
of selecting members of its governing body need not comply with the
voter equality requirement. 71 It is clear that voter equality has no application to representatives appointed by an executive officer such as
the governor. The reason is that such action does not contain the
requisite elements for a voter discrimination complaint based on the
equal protection clause. 72 It is difficult, however, to specify just what
the minimum elements for a voter equality claim are. In Sailors, the
countywide school board was chosen by delegates who were themselves
popularly elected representatives to their school boards. 73 Even though
this method was a form of indirect election somewhat analogous to
the electoral college system, the Court held that the positions were
not elective. The line between election and appointment is thus far
from obvious.7 4 Although this uncertainty may seem trivial, the distoo much, however, since any consumer of goods or services produced in the district could
avail himself of the same reasoning whether or not he lived in the district. The market
determines who will ultimately bear the costs; from the consumer's point of view, they can
hardly be said to be effects of local government.
69 The Wyoming Supreme Court applied somewhat novel reasoning in Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 490 P.2d 1069 (Wyo. 1971), calling a
local government a public corporation in order to avoid the Hadley rule.
70 See note 63 supra.
71 See text and notes at notes 32-36 supra.
72 See text and notes at notes 78-80 infra.
73 See note 34 supra.
74 Hadley's use of a "popular election" to indicate that the local government is of suf-
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tinction is likely to become one of the most important problems of
75
local reapportionment.
The use of appointed representation by regional governments is
one development that will surely bring this issue into prominence. One
example of such a system was at issue in People ex rel. Younger v.
County of El Dorado,71 in which the California Supreme Court dealt
with an apportionment challenge to a regional governing body. The
case involved the constitutionality of a compact between California
and Nevada setting up a regional agency to control land development
within the Lake Tahoe Basin. 7 Under the compact, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency was to have broad powers to enact and enforce
a system of land use ordinances for the conservation of the lake's
natural environment. Five counties and one city were to be represented on the governing board, and each governor was to appoint one
representative at large. The compact delegated the final selection of
the six local government representatives to the governing bodies of the
jurisdiction they were to represent. Each state set some limitations on
which individuals the local units could appoint. The California provisions, which were at issue, required the appointees to be residents
of the region and members of the local body that selected them.
The court, relying on the parallel between the El Dorado method
of selection and the one used in Sailors, reached the conclusion that
the representatives were appointed and that, consequently, "the fact
that they do not 'represent' equal numbers of people does not deny
those who are 'under-represented' equal protection of the laws. ' 78 In
both El Dorado and Sailors, an independent selection procedure inficient importance to all voters to require voter equality will meet the same definitional
problems as Sailors' elective-appointive distinction.
75 Bergerman v. Lindsay, 25 N.Y.2d 405, 255 N.E2d 142, 306 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 955 (1970), involved a challenge of a New York City charter provision
making elected borough presidents ex officio voting members of the board of estimate.
The plaintiffs argued that in giving each borough president an equal vote, the charter
underrepresented voters in larger boroughs. While the New York Court of Appeals upheld the charter provision, it did so, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hadley, on
the ground that the board of estimates did not have general governmental powers over
the jurisdiction. After Hadley, the result in a similar case would turn on whether there
was a popular election bringing it within Hadley's scope rule and an election rather than
an appointment bringing it within the Sailors requirement. Although the Hadley and
Sailors tests are based on different considerations, the fact that they both turn on similar
findings makes the definition of an elective system of selecting representatives of great
practical importance.
76 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971).
77 As required by the compact clause, Congress had approved the bistate agreement.
For a full discussion of the purpose of the compact, see Ayer, Water Quality Control at
Lake Tahoe: Dissertation on GrasshopperSoup, 1 EcoLosy L.Q. 3,50-57 (1971).

78 5 Cal. 3d at 505, 487 P.2d at 1209-10, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
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tervened between the voter and the representative finally selected by
his jurisdiction. Even if the choice of the voters were made known, it
would not be binding on the selection process; any discrimination
against voters can thus be only indirect.7 9 In addition, no explicit
legislative classification of voters can be clearly identified as depriving
them of equal protection since the law on its face does not refer to the
general electorate at all.8 0
El Dorado demonstrates that a regional government or other local
bodys may be able to avoid the voter equality requirement by following the Sailors formula. Although escaping one man, one vote was not
the California Legislature's primary motive for setting up the Tahoe
agency the way it did,8 2 the Sailors exception might be abused. To
preclude this, the Court could expand the scope of the voter equality
requirement by adopting an analysis denying exemptions where an
improper motive for establishing an appointive system of representation is found. 3 Even if the scope of the requirement is greatly expanded, however, some forms of local representation, such as those relying on executive appointments, will probably remain permanently
outside the domain of voter equality. This means that the use of appointive systems for avoidance purposes will depend largely on the
79 This contrasts with the elective selection procedure in Bergerman v. Lindsay, 25
N.Y.2d 405, 255 N.E2d 142, 306 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 955 (1970),
discussed in note 75 supra, in that the voters' choice for borough president conclusively
determined who would represent the borough on the board of estimate.
80 In some instances, an apparently appointive regional system of representation might
be found invalid because it created de facto classifications of voters by relying on local
election procedures. A regional body consisting of mayors of the cities within the region
utilizing the election procedures of the cities, for example, might be said to incorporate
each city as a classification of voters by reference to their selection procedures. Cf. Meadowlands Regional Development Agency v. New Jersey, 112 N.J. Super. 89, 270 A.2d 418
(1970). If either a discriminatory classification, actual or de facto, or a binding election
is not part of the regional system of representation, it is probably beyond the reach of
the voter equality requirement.
81 In Egan v. Wisconsin State Bd. of Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., 332 F. Supp.
964 (1971), a three-judge court upheld the representational structure of a special school
district engaged in adult and vocational education. Following Sailors, the court held that
the system was basically appointive because the board members were selected by other
local officials.
82 One of the major reasons for including elected local officials on regional bodies is that
they bring with them the necessary expertise in local government problem solving and are
useful in getting their local jurisdictions to cooperate with regional policies. The Tahoe
agency needed local officials on its governing board because it relied heavily on local
government cooperation in enforcing its policies. Ayer, supra note 77.
83 In other voting rights cases, the Court has been willing to go behind a law seemingly
innocuous on its face to strike down sophisticated but indirect methods of discriminating
against voters. Cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
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and on the relative burden

The Standard of Voter Equality

In addition to the scope issue, local government cases have faced
the problem of finding a standard for measuring whether a local
government is in compliance with the voter equality requirement.8 5
The compliance issue is important because it serves to define the
significance of the scope question. Obviously, if compliance means
eliminating only those variances between districts in excess of one
or two hundred percent, the issue of the forms of government subject to
such a standard will be of little importance. There is, however, substantial overlap in the problems raised by both issues. The same rationale for limiting the scope of the voter equality requirement where a
local government has a greatly disproportionate impact on certain voters
might be applied in similar instances to justify deviation from precise
numerical equality among districts. This overlap would seem to require
some uniformity in handling the scope and compliance issues.
In Avery, the Court adopted the Reynolds view when it held that
the Midland County commissioner districts must be redrawn without
substantial inequality.8 6 Hadley, while appearing to retain this approach, in fact imposed more restrictive requirements on local governments. 8 7 Conceding that the scheme in Hadley achieved roughly proportional representation, the Court nevertheless found it objectionable
since it "systematic[ally] discriminat[ed] against voters . . . in more
populous ... districts."8 8 The ten percent disparity that the plaintiffs
attacked arose because the plan allotted only fifty percent of the representation to school districts containing between one-half and two-thirds
of the school-age population. 9 This meant that any district with more
than one-half but less than two-thirds of the school-age population
would always be somewhat underrepresented. The majority opinion,
as Justice Harlan's dissent pointed out, 0 seems to suggest that the plan's
vice was not that it marginally underrepresented the plaintiff's district,
but that this and other discrepancies were technically avoidable. AL84 State constitutions and legislative acts frequently spedfy that certain forms of local
government shall be elective. S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, supranote 8, at 393-96.
85 Kirkpatrickv. Preisler,394 U.S. 526 (1969), deals with this issue at the state level.
86 390 U.S. at 485-86.
87 Justice Harlan's dissent indicates that Hadley applies Kirkpatrick's precise equality
standard. 397 U.S. at 66-67.
88 Id. at 57.
89 See text at note 47 supra.
90 See note 87 supra.
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though the Court in Hadley failed to mentioned Kirkpatrick's requirement of a good faith effort to eliminate all avoidable variances, Hadley
clearly moved far in the direction of requiring precise mathematical
equality in local reapportionment.
In Abate v. Mundt, 1 the Court last year disavowed the rigid standard of population equality implicit in Hadley. Abate involved a challenge to the reapportionment of the supervisorial districts of Rockland
County, New York under a plan that relied on township lines as districts in a system of multimember constituencies. Under the plan, the
least populous town, Stoney Point, was allotted one representative. The
number of representatives received by the remaining towns was determined by dividing each of their populations by that of Stoney Point
and rounding to the nearest whole number.9 2 Despite an eight percent
deviation from equality in one township, the Court upheld the plan
because it found that it contained no "indigenous bias." 93 This finding
apparently reflected the Court's view that the Rockland County plan,
unlike the plan in Hadley, was not systematically biased against any
identifiable groups or particular districts 9 4 Rather, only random bias
could result from the rounding-off procedure. The Court also found,
however, that lack of bias alone did not validate these deviations from
voter equality and required the further justification that the plan encouraged effective local government9 5
91 403 U.S. 183 (1971).
92 Id. at 184. On the constitutionality of multimember districts, see Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124 (1971), a companion case to Abate, and Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
93 403 U.S. at 186. Framing the issue of voter inequality in terms of bias against one
group or another is a marked departure from the Baker and Reynolds view that the right
to an equal ballot is a personal right enforceable by individual voters.
94 It is difficult, however, to see how the bias in Hadley was any more systematic since
the Missouri State Legislature created the apportionment scheme before any of the districts
were formed and without reference to their population size. Any bias that existed arose not
from the formula but from the relative size of high school districts that joined the junior
college district.
95 403 U.S. at 185. The Court found justification in the county's desire to continue
existing township lines as boundaries for representational districts, observing that local
government in the county depended on a network of functional interrelationships between
the county and towns that the new apportionment plan attempted to preserve. Under the
previous system of county government, township officials were also members of the county
board, which helped to create an atmosphere of cooperation between towns and the
county. The Court found that the new system tended to encourage the continuance of
this pattern of dual office holding because township officials could more easily run for
county office in districts that corresponded to their own jurisdictions.
Neither the New York Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court mentioned the common

law rule against dual office holding without express statutory authorization, McDonough
v. Roach, 35 N.J. 153, 171 A.2d 507 (1961), or the various statutory codifications and refinements of that doctrine in New York, see Lillich & Linton, Incompatible Municipal Offices
in New York, 28 FoanHAm L. Rr v. 463, 474 (1959).

656

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:639

Hadley and Abate could perhaps be reconciled by considering the
latter to be a special exception in which the local government succeeded in demonstrating that a compelling interest was being served by
the deviations from voter equality.96 It is difficult, however, to characterize Abate in this manner since the justifications offered were of a
kind that could be presented by virtually any local government. 7 The
crucial factor in Abate, therefore, appears to be the absence of systematic discrimination. This finding should be sufficient to support
the conclusion that greater equality is not necessary. If it appears that
a classification of voters, in this case by districting, operates to exclude
or noticeably diminish the influence of an identifiable interest group, it
would be invalid. If it is merely an imperfect classification that does not
single out any interested group for discriminatory treatment, modest inequalities would appear harmless. Following logic similar to that of
Kramer, s the concern should be whether any affected groups are significantly discriminated against by the deviations, not simply whether
numerical discrepancies exist. Viewed in this manner, Abate is a rejection of Hadley's focus on technically avoidable deviations.
On the ground either that there was no significant bias in the Rockland County plan or that its deviations from equality were justifiable,
-Abate is an important case for local governments. It gives them a
measure of flexibility in complying with the voter equality requirement that may assist them in governmental reorganization. It also provides leeway for population changes that could otherwise quickly invalidate an apportionment scheme. Abate does not directly resolve any
of the difficulties in determining the scope of application of one man,
one vote to local government. Broadly viewed, however, it lends support to an approach that looks at the actual effect of a local government
on potential voters rather than one that infers a significant effect from
the merely formal attribute of elective representation. Moreover, by
permitting less than exactly equal representation, Abate may provide
regional governments with an alternative to the appointive systems
sanctioned by Sailors. Within the margin of inequality allowed by
Abate, local gQvernments may be able to strike the kind of compromises
that make regional government possible. Even if A bate's tolerances are
96 This may be an indication that the burden of proof carried by the state in substantive

equal protection cases has lessened somewhat.
97 At bottom, Abate's justifications seem to be a defense of the status quo acceptable
because it was shown that the old system was a relatively effective way of conducting local
government.
98 See text and notes at notes 59-63 supra.

1972]

Voter Equality and Local Government

657

too narrow, it is still a hopeful indication that the Court will look more
favorably on the practical considerations of maintaining effective local
government.
Lock Holmes

